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Voluntary Reporting on Internal Control by Listed Dutch Companies 
 
Abstract: This study investigates whether voluntary reporting on internal control by 
company management can be viewed as a monitoring mechanism that reduces conflicts of 
interest between management, shareholders and debtholders. An agency framework is used to 
analyse management’s incentives for voluntary reporting on internal control. Empirical 
variables are chosen to proxy for external and internal agency costs. In addition, the effects of 
other monitoring mechanisms are tested. Multivariate tests are conducted on a sample of 149 
listed Dutch companies for the year 1997. Reporting on internal control is voluntary in the 
Netherlands. The results indicate that voluntary reporting on internal control is significantly 
correlated with variables that proxy for the agency costs of equity (i.e. management 
ownership and the percentage of shares held by large investors), but is not correlated with 
variables that proxy for agency costs of debt (i.e. leverage and the proportion of assets in 
place). In addition, voluntary reporting on internal control is significantly correlated with 
company size. 
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1. Introduction 
Reporting on internal control is an issue of considerable interest to policy makers involved in 
corporate governance issues. A fundamental assumption in public policy debates on this issue 
is that reporting on internal control improves the quality of financial reporting and reduces 
governance problems. If that is the case, reporting on internal control can been viewed as a 
monitoring mechanism that reduces conflicts of interest between management, shareholders 
and debtholders (i.e. agency costs). However, currently there is no empirical evidence 
regarding the association between agency costs and voluntary reporting on internal control. In 
this paper the hypothesis is tested whether voluntary reporting on internal control is used as a 
monitoring mechanism, by testing the effect of a selection of company characteristics on the 
extent of voluntary reporting on internal control by company management. The company 
characteristics proxy for agency costs. The extent of voluntary reporting on internal control 
will be measured in the annual statements of listed Dutch companies in 1997. The Dutch 
environment provides a suitable setting, because reporting on internal control is not required 
in the Netherlands. 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section presents a brief 
background on reporting on internal control and discusses previous empirical research in this 
area. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework used and develops the hypotheses to be 
tested. Section 4 details the research design. The results will be presented in section 5. The 
final section summarises and concludes the paper. 
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2. Background and Previous Research 
Over the past decades, a diverse group of interested parties has claimed that reporting on 
internal control by companies improves their financial reporting and is beneficial to capital 
suppliers and other stakeholders. In this section, a background will be presented by briefly 
outlining the main arguments, recommendations and requirements for reporting on internal 
control in the United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands. Subsequently, 
previous empirical research on internal control reporting will be discussed. 
 
2.1. Background 
In the United Kingdom the Cadbury Committee (1992a) recommended that listed 
companies should report on the effectiveness of the company’s system of internal control and 
that this report should be reviewed by the auditor. A working group of the Committee 
(Rutteman Committee 1994) provided guidance for directors on how they should report on 
internal control. The final report of the Hampel Committee (1998a) and its Combined Code 
(Hampel Committee 1998b) recommended that directors review the effectiveness of the 
internal control system and report to the shareholders that they have done so. The auditor 
should report on internal control privately to the directors. The Combined Code is supported 
by a compliance statement in the listing rules and a working party of the Committee 
(Turnbull Committee 1999) issued new guidance to implement the requirements relating to 
internal control and reporting on internal control. 
In the United States, successively the Cohen Commission (1978), the Treadway 
Commission (1987), COSO (1992), the POB (1993) and the Board of Directors of the AICPA 
(1993) recommended that management of public companies should report on internal control. 
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The Cohen Commission (1978), the POB (1993) and the AICPA (1993) went even one step 
further by suggesting that auditors should express an opinion on management’s assertions 
regarding internal control. The Treadway Commission (1987) noted that the investing public 
has a legitimate interest in the extent of management’s responsibilities for the company’s 
financial statements and internal control. They stated that management’s opinion on internal 
control is important because the internal control system provides the basis for the preparation 
of financial statements and more broadly, the overall system of accountability. Subsequently, 
COSO (1992) discussed in detail the internal control issues to report on. The POB (1993) and 
the AICPA (1993) both noted that increased auditor and top management involvement in 
reporting on internal control would improve the quality of financial reporting. Despite these 
strong views by various parties, the SEC has so far not required reporting on internal control1. 
In the Netherlands the Peters Committee (1997) has made a number of 
recommendations regarding reporting on internal control. Dutch companies have a two-tier 
board structure with an executive board of directors and a supervisory board. In accordance 
with Dutch law the supervisory board is ‘bound by the interests of the company’. It is 
responsible for the supervision of management policy and the general course of affairs in the 
company. In the annual report of Dutch companies, a report of the supervisory board is 
included. The Peters Committee (1997) recommended that at least once a year the 
supervisory board should discuss the results of the assessment of the systems of internal 
control by the board of directors. The fact that such a discussion has been held (and not 
necessarily the content of the discussion) should be mentioned in the supervisory board’s 
report in the company’s annual report. They further recommended that the board of directors 
should report in writing to the supervisory board on the mechanisms used to control financial 
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risks. The main items in this report should be a permanent part of the annual report. 
Compared to the United Kingdom and the United States, the recommendations of the Peters 
Committee (1997) are less extensive and detailed. Moreover, as in the United States, 
reporting on internal control is still voluntary in the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom 
stock exchange listing rules resulted in less freedom regarding reporting on internal control 
by requiring compliance to the Combined Code. 
 
2.2 Previous Research 
Considering the increased attention from various interested parties for reporting on internal 
control, relatively little empirical research has been done in this area. One of the first 
empirical studies in this field has been conducted by Raghunandan and Rama (1994). An 
analysis of the 1993 annual reports of Fortune 100 companies in the US revealed that 80 of 
the 100 companies included a management report on internal control and that the issues 
addressed in these reports were quite diverse. All of the 80 reports stated that the company 
maintained an internal control system in varying levels of detail. However, only six reports 
stated that the internal control system had been assessed to be effective. 
McMullen et al. (1996) further investigated companies that are voluntarily reporting 
on internal control in a US environment. McMullen et al. (1996) argue that the control 
consciousness of management is a plausible reason for voluntary reporting on internal 
control. Given that reporting on internal control is not mandatory and that there may be non-
trivial costs associated with reporting, they further argue that companies which are 
voluntarily reporting on internal control may be signalling their commitment to internal 
control to investors. Their study examined the possible usefulness of this signal by 
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investigating the association between reporting on internal control and the absence of 
financial reporting problems. Financial reporting problems were defined as SEC enforcement 
actions and corrected previously reported earnings. The results indicated that, for smaller 
companies, there is an association between internal control reporting and the absence of 
financial reporting problems. According to McMullen et al. (1996) these results support the 
argument that, at least for smaller companies, reporting on internal control could be a useful 
signal. The study however does not provide further empirical evidence for the signalling 
argument as an explanation for voluntary reporting on internal control. 
Hermanson (2000) documented the demand for internal control reporting by 
surveying several financial statement user groups in the US. Overall, the results indicated that 
the respondents agree that internal controls are important. They generally agreed that 
voluntary reporting on internal control motivates management to improve internal control, 
improves the oversight process of audit committees, and provides additional information for 
decision making. If reporting was mandatory the respondents felt less strongly about the 
informational value. The diminished informational value of mandatory reporting on internal 
control could mean that the respondents perhaps view voluntary reporting on internal control 
as a signal as suggested by McMullen et al. (1996). 
 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
As pointed out in the previous section, a fundamental assumption in public policy debates 
and reports is that reporting on internal control improves the quality of financial reporting and 
reduces governance problems. In this section, agency theory will provide a framework for 
developing the hypotheses. Company management that chooses to report more extensively on 
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internal control is hypothesized to be seeking a higher level of monitoring because of higher 
agency costs. To the extent possible, a distinction is made between internal and external 
agency costs. 
 
3.1 Agency Theory 
 Internal agency costs arise from conflicting interests and information asymmetry 
between top managers and lower-level employees within the company. Management can 
reduce internal agency costs by monitoring subordinates’ actions. A possible monitoring 
mechanism is the internal control system of the company (Abdel-khalik 1993). McMullen et 
al. (1996) give two reasons why reporting on internal control by company management can 
lead to enhanced internal controls. For both reasons reporting on internal control can be 
viewed as a monitoring mechanism that can help reduce internal agency costs. First, reporting 
on internal control can increase the internal control awareness of top management, which in 
turn can lead to greater attention being paid by top management to the internal control system 
in general. Second, reporting on internal control can lead to better internal controls because it 
helps to communicate the tone at the top by sending a clear message within the organisation 
about the expected control environment. Others also have noted that reporting on internal 
control can lead to better internal controls. The POB (1993) noted that company management 
will evaluate the internal control system before reporting on it and that evaluating the system 
will lead to improvements of the system. 
 External agency costs arise from conflicting interests and information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders, and between shareholders and debtholders (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). Because financial accounting information plays an important role in 
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contracting in defining contract terms and in monitoring the performance of contracts (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1986), a possible way for company management to reduce external agency 
costs is to improve the reliability of financial reporting. Reporting on internal control can 
improve the reliability of financial accounting information in two ways, and is therefore 
regarded in this study as a possible monitoring mechanism that can help reduce external 
agency costs. First, reporting on internal control can lead to enhanced internal controls as 
suggested by McMullen et al. (1996). Better internal controls in turn can lead to more reliable 
financial reporting. Second, McMullen et al. (1996) argue that companies, which are 
voluntarily reporting on internal control, might be signalling their commitment to internal 
control (i.e. the tone at the top) to investors. The tone at the top - the corporate control 
environment or culture within which financial reporting occurs - is an important factor 
contributing to the reliability of financial accounting information (Treadway Commission 
1987). 
 As explained above, reporting on internal control is regarded in this study as a 
possible monitoring mechanism that can help reduce internal and external agency costs. Since 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) provided a framework of analysis based on agency relationships, 
many empirical studies have used this framework to analyse voluntary implementation of 
monitoring mechanisms by company management. Various monitoring mechanisms have 
been subject of study. Chow (1982) studied the demand for voluntary external auditing. 
Others have investigated quality differentiated external audits (e.g. Francis and Wilson 1988, 
DeFond 1992). Ettredge et al. (1994) analysed companies purchasing timely reviews by an 
external accountant. Carey et al. (2000) studied the monitoring role of internal and external 
auditing. The monitoring role of voluntary corporate disclosure has been studied by Leftwich 
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et al. (1981), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), and Craswell and Taylor (1992). Leftwich et al. 
(1981) investigated reporting frequency, Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) measured the extent 
of voluntary financial disclosures and Craswell and Taylor (1992) analyzed discretionary 
disclosure of reserves by oil and gas companies. Voluntary formation of audit committees for 
monitoring purposes has been examined by Pincus et al. (1989), Bradbury (1990), and Collier 
(1993). The monitoring role of audit committees has been further investigated by Menon and 
Williams (1994) and Collier and Gregory (1999). Menon and Williams (1994) investigated 
whether the board of directors relies on audit committees and Collier and Gregory (1999) 
investigated audit committee activities. 
 
3.2 Agency Conflict Hypotheses 
Company management that chooses to report more extensively on internal control is 
hypothesized to be seeking a higher level of monitoring because of higher internal and 
external agency costs. The variables used to proxy for agency costs are discussed below. 
Agency costs of equity and debt are considered to be external agency costs. Company size is 
associated with both external and internal agency costs. 
 
Agency costs of equity 
The first proxy for the agency costs of equity used in this study is management’s ownership 
share of the company. Higher managent’s ownership will lower the agency costs of equity 
because manager’s and shareholders’ incentives are more aligned (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). This leads to the first hypothesis: 
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 H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between management’s 
ownership and the extent to which company management reports on internal 
control. 
The second proxy for the agency cost of equity is the extent to which the shares of a 
company are held by small (individual), rather than large (institutional) investors. The net 
benefit of monitoring mechanisms implemented by company management may be higher for 
individual investors with small shareholdings as it is relatively more expensive and difficult 
for these investors to actively monitor management’s activities themselves. Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992: 497) argue that larger shareholders are possibly more willing and able to play 
an active monitoring role. Following this argument, the agency costs of equity are lower if a 
company is owned by large investors. This will give company management less incentive to 
implement additional monitoring mechanisms. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2:  Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the percentage of 
shares held by large investors and the extent to which company management 
reports on internal control. 
 
Agency costs of debt 
The first proxy for the agency cost of debt is leverage. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
others have suggested that higher leverage will increase agency costs because the potential 
for wealth transfers from debtholders to shareholders increases. This leads to the third 
hypothesis: 
 H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between leverage and the extent 
to which company management reports on internal control. 
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  The second proxy for the agency cost of debt is the proportion of assets in place. 
According to Myers (1977) the value of the company can be seen as the sum of assets already 
in place and the present value of future investment opportunities. Wealth transfers between 
debtholders and shareholders are more difficult with assets already owned than assets yet to 
be acquired. This leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
 H4: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the proportion of 
assets in place and the extent to which company management reports on 
internal control. 
 
Company size 
Company size is associated with both external and internal agency costs. Chow (1982) states 
that external agency costs increase with company size as the amount of potential wealth 
transfers increases with company size. Abdel-khalik (1993) argues that internal agency costs 
increase with company size because of the increased risk of organisational loss of control in 
larger organisations. In addition, the marginal costs of implementing monitoring mechanisms 
are suggested to decrease with company size (Chow 1982). This leads to the fifth hypothesis: 
 H5:  Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between company size and the 
extent to which company management reports on internal control. 
 
Other monitoring mechanisms 
Two monitoring mechanisms investigated in the previously mentioned studies on the 
voluntary implementation of monitoring mechanisms are considered here: the presence of an 
audit committee (Pincus et al. 1989, Bradbury 1990, Collier 1993, Menon and Williams 
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1994, Collier and Gregory 1999) and audit quality (Francis and Wilson 1988, DeFond 1992). 
The extent of voluntary reporting on internal control being positively correlated with other 
monitoring mechanisms will support its complimentary nature, while a negative association 
will suggest that it functions as a substitute monitoring mechanism. Because the nature of the 
association is unclear, the following hypotheses are expressed in the null form: 
 H6: Ceteris paribus, there is no association between the presence of an audit 
committee and the extent to which company management reports on internal 
control. 
 H7: Ceteris paribus, there is no association between audit quality and the extent to 
which company management reports on internal control. 
 
3.3 Control Variable 
The Dutch stock exchange requires that companies with a foreign stock exchange listing 
provide the Dutch market with the same information as the foreign market. As discussed 
before, the stock exchange listing rules in the United Kingdom result in less freedom in the 
reporting choice on internal control and add some element of obligation by requiring stating 
compliance to the Combined Code. For this reason, management of companies with a listing 
at the London Stock Exchange is more likely to report on internal control in the annual 
report. This leads to the last hypothesis: 
 H8: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between listing at the London 
Stock Exchange and the extent to which company management reports on 
internal control. 
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4. Research Design 
 
4.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The sample used in this study consists of public Dutch companies that were listed on the 
Amsterdam stock exchange during 1997. Stocks listed at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are 
actively traded. Investment funds, financial institutions (e.g. banks and insurance companies) 
and companies that had no two-tier board system were excluded from the sample. In addition, 
companies that were unlisted during 1997 were excluded. The final sample consisted of 149 
companies. Data on the dependent variable were found in the company’s annual report. Most 
data on the explanatory variables were available in the public Dutch databases ‘REACH’ and 
‘Het Financieel Economisch Lexicon’. In addition, data from the Dutch financial newspaper 
‘Het Financieele Dagblad’ were used. 
 
4.2. Dependent Variable 
The extent to which company management voluntarily reports on internal control has been 
operationalised with an internal control reporting score (ICR). ICR was obtained by using a 
three-step process, which is described below. Measuring internal control reporting this way is 
similar to disclosure indices used in prior studies that investigated the association between 
company characteristics and disclosure level (e.g. Chow and Wong-boren 1987, Botosan 
1997). Although these studies have shown that disclosure indices are a useful research tool, 
deriving a summated scale is difficult, as it requires subjective assessments by the researcher 
applying the technique. Therefore it is critical to assess the internal consistency of ICR and to 
examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative measures of ICR. 
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The first step in determining ICR was to identify the items regarding reporting on 
internal control. By referring to the previously discussed public policy reports on corporate 
governance and internal control, a list of 8 separate reportable items was generated. The 
separate items are presented in the first column of table 1, and are discussed below. The first 
three items have been derived from the recommendations regarding internal control made by 
the Dutch Committee on Corporate Governance (Peters Committee 1997). The remaining 
items have been derived from public policy reports in the United States (COSO 1992) and the 
United Kingdom (Cadbury Committee 1992a, Hampel Committee 1998a and Turnbull 
Committee 1999). The Peters report was published in 1997 and company management had 
the opportunity to comply with the recommendations in their 1997 annual report. Although 
the Hampel Committee report and the Turnbull guidance were published after 1997, their 
recommendations and guidance were based on public opinions developed earlier and on 
actual reporting practices in previous years. This makes it possible that companies reported 
the recommended information in 1997. 
 Item 1. As discussed before, the Peters Committee (1997) recommended that at least 
once a year the supervisory board should discuss the results of the assessment of the systems 
of internal control by the board of directors. The fact that such a discussion has been held 
(and not necessary the content of the discussion) should be mentioned in the supervisory 
board’s report in the company’s annual report. Typically, the supervisory board reported on 
this item by stating that ‘in our meetings attention was paid to the internal control system’.  
 Item 2. Another recommendation made by the Peters Committee (1997) was that the 
supervisory board should meet with the external auditor at least once a year. Item 2 represents 
the fact that the supervisory board mentions that such a meeting was held and that certain 
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elements of the internal control system were discussed during this meeting. Usually, the 
supervisory board reported on this item by stating that ‘in the presence of the external auditor, 
the internal control system was discussed’. 
  Item 3. The Peters Committee (1997) further recommended that the board of directors 
should report in writing to the supervisory board on the mechanisms used to control financial 
risks. The main issues in this report should be a permanent part of the annual report. 
Commonly, the board of directors reported on this item by stating that ‘the board of directors 
reports in writing to the supervisory board on the mechanisms used to control financial risk’. 
  Item 4. COSO (1992) stated that the internal control system is designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: 
efficiency and effectiveness of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance 
with laws and regulations. Consequently, COSO (1992) suggests that management should 
state whether an internal control system has been established to achieve these objectives. The 
Hampel Committee (1998a) stated that a company’s system of internal control safeguards 
shareholder’s and company’s assets. In addition, the Turnbull Committee (1999) mentions 
that internal control is one of the principal elements in the management of risks and the fact 
that there is an on-going process for identifying, evaluating and managing company’s risk 
should be reported in the annual report. This leads to including item 4, which is valued one if 
the board of directors stated the objectives of their internal control system in the annual 
report. Frequently reported objectives of the internal control system were control of risk 
associated with the business activities, controlling the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
business activities, safeguarding of assets, compliance with laws and regulation, and reliable 
management and financial reporting. 
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  Item 5. COSO (1992), the Cadbury Committee (1992a) and the Hampel Committee 
(1998a) have emphasised management’s responsibilities for internal control and 
recommended that management makes a statement on their responsibilities in the annual 
report. According to COSO (1992) management should state that it is responsible for 
devising and maintaining a system of internal control. The Turnbull Committee (1999) 
recommended that the board of directors’ disclosures should include an acknowledgement by 
the board that it is responsible for the internal control system and for reviewing its 
effectiveness. Most companies reporting on the responsibility for the internal control system 
stated that ‘within the framework established by the board of directors, operational 
management is responsible for the functioning of the internal control system’. 
  Item 6. Another approach for management to discuss its responsibilities is to state its 
belief as to whether it has fulfilled specific responsibilities (COSO 1992). Management might 
for example address the effectiveness or the adequacy of the company’s internal control 
system. The Cadbury Committee (1992a) also made this recommendation. The Hampel 
Committee (1998a) encouraged directors to report on the effectiveness but did not require 
stating an opinion. Generally, companies reporting on item 6 stated that ‘the board of 
directors considers the internal control system to be adequate’. 
  Item 7. The Turnbull Committee (1999) considered information on how management 
makes use of the work of the internal auditor to be important as it provides information on 
how the board of directors has reviewed the effectiveness of the system. COSO (1992) also 
recommended discussing the program of internal auditing. Companies reporting on this item 
often stated that ‘the internal auditors monitor the internal control system and report their 
findings to the board of directors’. 
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  Item 8. Discussion of specific elements of internal control has been recommended by 
COSO (1992). According to the Turnbull Committee (1999) the board of directors may wish 
to provide additional information in the annual report to assist understanding of the 
company’s risk management processes and system of internal control. Most companies 
reporting on this item discussed specific controls used for managing risk. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
  The second step in determining ICR was closely examining the annual report of each 
company in the sample and identifying the presence of each item. The number and 
percentage of companies in the sample reporting on each item are shown in table 1. 
The third step taken was to calculate an unweighted score for each company in the 
sample by summing the individual items company management reported on. This implies that 
all items are considered to be equally important in reporting on internal control. The resulting 
variable ICR ranks the extent to which company management voluntarily reports internal 
control items and is therefore treated in this study as an ordered variable. Section 5.4 
discusses the sensitivity of the results for the items included in ICR. 
 
4.3 Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables follow from the hypotheses developed in section 3. The 
measurement of each variable is stated below.  
H1 - Management’s ownership (MO). In the Netherlands it is not required to report the 
percentage of shares held by company management in the annual report. Owners of more 
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than 5% of the shares of a listed company however are required to report their share of 
ownership to the Dutch stock exchange supervisor ‘Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer’ 
(Securities Board of the Netherlands). Because this data is publicly available, it was possible 
to compare the names of these shareholders with the names of the members of the board of 
directors and calculate management’s ownership by adding up the percentage of shares held 
by members of the board of directors. As a result of this, management shareholdings smaller 
than 5% are not accounted for. H2 - Percentage of shares held by large investors (LI). Using 
the data reported to the Dutch stock exchange supervisor, the percentage of shares owned by 
large investors was calculated by adding up the percentages of shareholdings of non-
managers greater than 5% (i.e. shareholdings of less than 5% are considered to be small 
investors). H3 - Leverage (LEV). Leverage is measured here as the ratio of the book value of 
debt to the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt. H4 - Proportion of 
assets in place (AIP). The proportion of assets in place is measured here by the ratio of the 
book value of fixed assets to the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of 
debt. H5 - Company size (SIZE). Company size is measured in this study as the natural 
logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt. H6 - Presence 
of an audit committee (AC). The presence of an audit Committee is measured by a dummy 
variable, which is set to one if the supervisory board has formed an audit committee from 
among its members. H7 - Audit quality (AQ). Audit quality is measured by a dummy variable, 
which is set to one if the company’s financial statements are audited by a Big 5 auditor. H8 - 
Listing at the London Stock Exchange (LSE). This is a dummy variable, which is set to one if 
a company is listed at the London Stock Exchange. 
 
 19 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
Table 2 contains descriptive data for the variables in the model. Most variables are skewed 
and have high kurtosis. In addition, Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample tests showed that the 
assumption about the normality of the distribution for all variables except SIZE could be 
rejected at conventional probability levels (p<.05).  
ICR’s average value of 1.6 is quite low. The highest observed value of ICR is 6, 
which means that none of the 149 companies reported on all 8 items listed in table 1. More 
specifically, 40 (27% of 149) companies reported on none of the items, 38 (26%) reported on 
1 item, 40 (27%) reported on 2 items, 16 (11%) reported on 3 items, 5 (3%) reported on 4 
items, 7 (5%) reported on 5 items, and 3 (2%) reported on 6 items. As a result, ICR is ranked 
from 0 to 6 in further analysis. 
 Several tests were carried out to assess the internal consistency of ICR. The 
correlation coefficients of each item to the total score are all positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Most correlation coefficients among items are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Cronbach’s alpha is .67. The generally agreed lower limit for 
Cronbach’s alpha is .70, although it may decrease to .60 in exploratory research (Robinson et 
al. 1991). This means that random measurement error could reduce the power of the 
empirical tests that follow2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
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Table 3 presents pairwise Spearman correlations among the variables used in the 
model. Kendall’s tau, another nonparametric measure of association, yielded identical results 
for both direction and significance of all reported correlation coefficients3. The Spearman 
correlations between ICR and the explanatory variables in the first row provide a univariate 
test for each explanatory variable. Two-tailed probabilities were calculated for AQ and AC, 
as no association has been hypothesised between ICR and these variables. The univariate 
results show that the explanatory variables, except those which proxy for agency costs of 
debt, are significantly correlated with ICR (p<.05) in the direction hypothesised. LEV and 
AIP are not significantly correlated with ICR and the direction of the correlation between AIP 
and ICR is contrary to that hypothesised. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
5.2 Multivariate Test 
The lower triangular in table 3 presents Spearman correlations among the explanatory 
variables. Many significant correlations exist and the degree of correlation suggest that the 
results of the univariate tests may be overstated. A multivariate test is an appropriate means 
to consider simultaneous effects of the explanatory variables on ICR. While in general there 
is little indication of multi-collinearity present, consistent with Leftwich et al. (1981) the 
correlation coefficient between LEV and AIP is quite high (.74 and significant at the 1% 
level, two-tailed). For this reason first LEV and then AIP were excluded in multivariate 
testing. These tests yielded identical results for both the direction and the significance of all 
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coefficients in the model, which suggests that the high correlation has no material 
consequences for the multivariate results reported below. 
The multivariate technique used in this study is ordered logit analysis4. The ordered 
logit model takes into account the ordinal nature of ICR and makes no assumptions regarding 
the distribution of the explanatory variables5. The estimated coefficients of an ordered logit 
analysis however must be interpreted with care (Greene 2000: 878)6. 
Table 4 shows the results of the ordered logit analysis. Two-tailed probabilities were 
calculated for AQ and AC, as no association has been hypothesised between ICR and these 
variables. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
The maximised value of the log-likelihood function is -217.41 and the value of the 
model’s likelihood ratio statistic is 51.02 (8df), meaning that the null hypothesis of no 
statistical association can be rejected at the .00 level of confidence. The likelihood ratio index 
is an analog to the R2 of a conventional regression and measures the ordered logit model’s 
goodness of fit. The value of the likelihood ratio index is 10.1%. 
The results of the ordered logit analysis show that both variables that proxy for agency 
costs of equity are significantly correlated with ICR in the direction hypothesised. The 
percentage of shares owned by company management (MO) is significantly correlated with 
ICR at the 1 % level and the percentage of shares held by large investors (LI) is significantly 
correlated at the 5 % level. However, no significant correlation was found between ICR and 
the variables that proxy for agency costs of debt. Although the sign of the coefficients of the 
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leverage variable (LEV) and assets in place (AIP) are both in the direction hypothesised, the 
coefficients are not significant. The results further show that company size (SIZE) is 
significantly correlated (p<.05) in the direction hypothesised (i.e. positive). The association 
between other monitoring mechanisms and ICR is weak. The existence of an audit committee 
(AC) and audit quality (AQ) are both positively correlated (i.e. complementary monitoring 
mechanisms), but the coefficient of AC is not significant and the significance level of the 
coefficient of AQ is only moderate (p<.10). 
Finally, the control variable for listing at the London Stock Exchange (LSE) has a 
significant positive effect on ICR (p<.01). This indicates that management as a result of 
listing rules in the UK reports more extensively on internal control and provides the Dutch 
market with the same information7. 
 
5.3 Alternative Tests 
The simultaneous effect of the explanatory variables on ICR has also been tested using OLS 
regression. The OLS model estimated was also highly significant (p<.00) and had a R2 of 
27.1%. Direct comparison of the R2 of the OLS model and the Pseudo-R2 of the ordered logit 
model however, is not possible. The regression coefficients estimated lead to identical 
conclusions. In addition to these regression estimates, bootstrapped estimates of the OLS 
model were calculated. Bootstrapping does not rely on a single model estimation but instead 
calculates parameter estimates and their confidence intervals based on multiple observations. 
The results of bootstrap resampling are similar to direct estimation and lead to identical 
conclusions. 
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5.4 Sensitivity of the Results 
Obtaining an internal control reporting score (ICR) is difficult because deciding which items 
should be included in calculating the score requires subjective judgement. ICR tested in the 
previous sections was based on all 8 reportable items identified (see table 1). By one-for-one 
excluding each item from the original score, the sensitivity of the results of the ordered logit 
analysis for the items included in the score was tested8.  
The results of this sensitivity test show that the coefficients of MO, LI and LSE 
remain significant (p<.05). The coefficient of SIZE remains significant as long as item 8 is 
included in the score. If item 8 is excluded from the score, the coefficient of SIZE becomes 
moderately significant (p<.10). Comparing the goodness of fit gives an indication of the 
impact of item 8. The likelihood ratio indices remain approximately 10% if item 8 is included 
in the score. If item 8 is excluded, the likelihood ratio index drops to 8%. Overall, the 
sensitivity analyses show that the results presented in previous sections are not driven by a 
single item included in the score. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Reporting on internal control by company management has been frequently recommended as 
a possible way to improve financial reporting and reduce governance problems. Using a 
sample of 149 listed Dutch companies, this study finds that the extent of voluntary reporting 
on internal control varies considerably between companies. In this study company 
management that chooses to report more extensively on internal control is hypothesized to be 
seeking a higher level of monitoring because of higher external and internal agency costs. 
Overall, the results lend support to this hypothesis. 
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 The results show that there is a positive association between firm size, a proxy for 
both external and internal agency costs, and the extent to which company management 
voluntarily reports on internal control. Reporting on internal control is also found to increase 
with variables that proxy for agency costs of equity. This is consistent with the argument that 
voluntary reporting on internal control enables company management to improve the quality 
of financial reporting. Agency problems related to debt financing, however, do not appear to 
affect voluntary reporting on internal control. This might indicate that debtholders have 
alternative ways to establish the importance given by top management to the issue of internal 
control. The results further weakly suggest that reporting on internal control is 
complementary to other monitoring mechanisms. Both univariate and multivariate tests show 
a positive correlation, but only the univariate results are significant. Finally, the results show 
that Dutch companies listed on the London Stock Exchange report more extensively on 
internal control. It is argued that these companies have less freedom in their reporting choice. 
In all, these results show that there is an economic basis for the decision to report on 
internal control. The results therefore do not to appear to point to a need for extensive 
government regulation in this area. Mandating reporting on internal control could cause 
companies with lower agency costs to overspend on monitoring. Mandatory reporting on 
internal control would also remove the signalling aspect (see section 3.1). However a caveat 
is in order here. This caveat concerns the overall explanatory power of the multivariate 
analyses (both ordered logit and OLS). Holding aside potential measurement error problems, 
the agency variables appear to affect voluntary reporting on internal control only moderately. 
Managements’ decision to report on internal control appears to be more complex than 
modelled in this study. 
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TABLE 1 
Internal control reporting items, and  
the number (%) of companies reporting on these items 
(n=149) 
 
 Number (%) of 
companies reporting 
on this item 
Items reported by the supervisory board in the supervisory board’s report  
(which is included in the annual report): 
   
          
 Item 1. The supervisory board discussed (elements of) the internal control 
system in at least one of their meetings. 
 77 (51.7) 
 Item 2. The supervisory board discussed (elements of) the internal control 
system with the external auditor. 
 27 (18.1) 
   
Items reported by the board of directors:   
 
 Item 3. The board of directors reports to the supervisory board on elements 
of the internal control system. 
 13 (8.7) 
 Item 4. The objectives of the internal control system.  14 (9.4) 
 Item 5. Management’s responsibilities for the internal control system.  7 (4.7) 
 Item 6. A statement on the internal control system effectiveness.  8 (5.4) 
 Item 7. Internal auditing issues.  13 (8.7) 
 Item 8. Specific controls used for managing risk.  80 (53.7) 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics 
(n=149) 
Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
AGENCY VARIABLES 
 Management Ownership (MO) 4.88 .00 15.05 .00 88.22 3.56 12.62 
 Large Investors (LI) 37.46 33.38 27.19 .00 100.00 .44 -.80 
 Leverage (LEV) .86 .58 1.15 .02 11.56 6.02 50.90 
 Assets in Place (AIP) .64 .38 .86 .01 8.01 5.00 37.35 
 Company Size (SIZE 19.81 19.70 1.98 15.55 26.20 .42 .00 
 Audit Committee (AC) .13 .00 .34 .00 1.00 2.17 2.74 
 Audit Quality (AQ) .95 1.00 .23 .00 1.00 -4.00 14.19 
CONTROL VARIABLE  
 London Stock Exchange (LSE) .06 .00 .24 .00 1.00 3.73 12.06 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 Internal Control Reporting (ICR) 1.60 1.00 1.47 .00 6.00 1.01 .73 
* MO = percentage of shares held by company management; LI = percentage of shares held by large investors; 
LEV = ratio of the book value of total debt to the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of 
debt; AIP = ratio of the book value of fixed assets to the sum of the market value of equity and the book value 
of debt; SIZE = natural logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt; AC = 
dummy variable which is set to one if the supervisory board has formed an audit committee; AQ = dummy 
variable which is set to one if the company’s financial statements are audited by a Big 5 auditor; LSE = 
dummy variable which is set to one if a company is listed at the London Stock Exchange; ICR = score that 
measures the extent of voluntary reporting on internal control by company management. 
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TABLE 3 
Spearman correlations among variables 
  MO  LI  LEV  AIP  SIZE  AC  AQ  LSE 
ICR  -.23 a  -.14 b .10  .13  .43 a .30 c .21 d .34 a 
                  
MO  1.00                
LI  -.33 c 1.00              
LEV  -.18 d .20 d 1.00            
AIP  -.25 c .14  .74 c 1.00          
SIZE  -.13  -.20 d -.23 c -.08  1.00        
AC  -.12  -.05  .03  .12  .40 c 1.00      
AQ  -.07  -.03  .16  .16 d .22 c .09  1.00    
LSE  -.11  -.13  -.07  .07  .35 c .31 c .06  1.00  
* ICR = Internal Control Reporting; MO = Management Ownership; LI = Large Investors; LEV = Leverage; 
AIP = Assets in Place; SIZE = Company Size; AC = Audit Committee; AQ = Audit Quality; LSE = London 
Stock Exchange. 
a 
b 
c 
d 
Significant at the .01 level (one-tailed). 
Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed). 
Significant at the .01 level (two-tailed). 
Significant at the .05 level (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 4 
Ordered logit analysis of the association between  
the explanatory variables and Internal Control Reporting (ICR) 
(n=149) 
 Hypothesis Variables Predicted sign β-Coefficient z-Statistic 
AGENCY VARIABLES 
 H1  Management Ownership (MO) - -.031  -2.658 a 
 H2  Large Investors (LI) - -.011  -1.740 b 
 H3  Leverage (LEV) + .213  .810  
 H4  Assets in Place (AIP) - -.358  -1.054  
 H5  Company Size (SIZE + .224  2.230 b 
 H6  Audit Committee (AC) ? .603  1.287  
 H7  Audit Quality (AQ) ? 1.591  1.814 c 
CONTROL VARIABLE 
 H8  London Stock Exchange (LSE) + 1.586  2.365 a 
          
   Log likelihood -217.41    
   LR statistic (8df) 51.02  (p =.00) 
   LR index (Pseudo-R2) .105    
a 
b 
c 
Significant at the .01 level (one-tailed). 
Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed). 
Significant at the .10 level (two-tailed). 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Although the SEC attempted to mandate reporting on internal control in 1979 and 1988, it failed to do so 
(Solomon and Cooper 1990). 
2 Botosan (1997), who used a disclosure index to investigate the determinants of corporate disclosure, reported a 
Cronbach coefficient alpha of .64. 
3 Only nonparametric measures of association are appropriate here because the dependent variable ICR is treated 
as an ordered variable and both the dependent and explanatory variables (except SIZE) have non-normal 
distributions. 
4 Following the work of Aitchison and Silvey (1957) the ordered logit model is set up as follows: y* = β’x + ε; 
where y* is the unobserved dependent variable, x is a vector of explanatory variables, β is an unknown 
parameter vector, and ε represents the error term which is caused by unobserved factors. Instead of y* the 
following is observed: y = 0 if y* ≤ µ1; y = 1 if µ1 ≤ y* ≤ µ2; y = 2 if µ2 ≤ y* ≤ µ3; …; y = 6 if µ6 ≤ y*; where µ is 
a vector of unknown threshold values that is estimated with the β vector. The error term ε is assumed to have a 
standard logistic distribution. The probability of observing each value of y is calculated as follows: Prob(y=k) = 
Φ(µk+1 - β’x) - Φ(µk - β’x); where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of ε. The probabilities of observing 
each value of y are used to derive a log likelihood function. Estimates of β and µ are obtained by maximising the 
log likelihood function. 
5 Although the outcome of ICR is discrete, multinomial logit analysis would fail to account for the ordinal 
nature of this variable. Ordinary regression on the other hand would treat the difference between a score of 0 
and 1, the same as the difference between a score of 1 and 2, whereas in fact they are only a ranking (Greene 
2000: 875). In addition, all variables except SIZE have a non-normal distribution. Ordinary regression requires 
that for each value of the independent variable, the distribution of the dependent variable is normal. 
6 The derivative of Prob(y=0) has the opposite direction sign from the coefficient estimate and the derivative of 
Prob(y=6) has the same sign as coefficient estimate. The signs of the changes in the other probabilities are 
ambiguous as for each probability the marginal effect of changes in x is equal to [∂ Φ(µk+1-β’x) / ∂ x] – [∂ Φ(µk-
β’x) / ∂ x]. 
7 Additional tests were conducted for foreign stock exchange listings at stock exchanges with no explicit listing 
requirements regarding reporting on internal control (e.g. New York). These listings had no significant effect on 
ICR. 
8 To prevent possible problems of multi-collinearity caused by the relative high correlation between the LEV 
and AIP, both variables were included separately in the ordered logit models tested in this section. The results of 
the ordered logit analysis with LEV instead of AIP are discussed here. The results of ordered logit analysis with 
AIP instead of LEV are similar and lead to identical conclusions. 
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